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THE ROMANCE OF REVENGE: 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
Samuel R. Gross 
Before serving on the Royal Commission [on Capital Punishment] ... I should 
probably have said that I was in favor of the death penalty, and disposed to regard 
abolitionists as people whose hearts were bigger than their heads. Four years 
of close study of the subject gradually dispelled that feeling. In the end I became 
convinced that the abolitionists were right in their conclusions-though I could 
not agree with ali their arguments-and that so far from the sentimental approach 
leading into their camp and the rational one into that of the supporters, it was 
the other way about. 
-Sir Ernest Gowers (1956, p. 8) 
AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF JEFFREY DAHMER 
On February 17, 1992, Jeffrey Dahmer was sentenced to 15 consecutive terms 
of life imprisonment for killing and dismembering 15 young men and boys 
(Associated Press 1992a). Dahmer had been arrested six months earlier, on 
July 22, 1991. On January 13 he pled guilty to the fifteen murder counts against 
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him, leaving open only the issue of his sanity. Jury selection began two weeks 
later, and the trial proper started on January 30. The jury heard two weeks 
of testimony about murder, mutilation and necrophilia; they deliberated for 
5 hours before finding that Dahmer was sane when he committed these crimes. 
After the verdict, a minister who had counselled members of the victims' 
families said "I think this will be the beginning of a healing" (Worthington 
1992). At his sentencing two days later, Dahmer said "I take all the blame for 
what I did .... Your honor, it is over now. This has never been a case of trying 
to get free. I never wanted freedom" (Associated Press 1992b ). His lawyer told 
the press that no appeal was planned (Associated Press 1992a). 
What matters most about the Dahmer case is what he did, which is 
unspeakable. What happened after his arrest is of minor importance by 
comparison. Still, within the sphere in which it operates, the criminal justice 
system did very well in this case. It handled a revolting set of crimes and a 
potentially explosive trial with as much civility, compassion, and dispatch as 
possible. Half a year after the arrest, the trial was truly over, and, let us hope, 
the healing did begin. 
Jeffrey Dahmer was tried in Milwaukee, Wisconsin-one of the 14 American 
states that have no death penalty. How would this drama play in one of the 
36 other states-Illinois, or California, or Texas, or Pennsylvania? He would 
certainly be charged with capital murder, and then a new set of horrors would 
begin. 
At the outset, it is very unlikely that Dahmer would plead guilty if he faced 
the death penalty. He might still want to do so, at least initially; after all, at 
his sentencing Dahmer told the judge: "Frankly, I wanted death for myself." 
(Worthington 1992) His lawyers, however, would feel bound to advise him 
against pleading guilty to a certain death sentence. At a minimum, they would 
delay any possible entry of a guilty plea for as long as possible, to prevent 
their client from taking a fatal step that he could not undo; if necessary, they 
might attempt to get the court to declare him unfit to enter a plea on his own 
behalf. In addition (and probably more important), if their client were facing 
the electric chair (or the gas chamber, or lethal injection) Dahmer's lawyers 
would be much more concerned to prevent him from cooperating with the 
police in their investigation. They might not be able to keep their client from 
confessing fully, repeatedly, and in detail-as he did (Worthington 1992)-
but then again they might. 
As soon as Dahmer was arrested in Wisconsin, it was clear that he would 
never be released. That would be equally true in Illinois, or in any other death 
penalty state, but the significance of that fact would be vastly different. In 
Milwaukee it meant that the defense had no strong incentive to delay the day 
of judgment, since the only open question was which state institution Dahmer 
would live and die in. In Chicago the issue would be how long he would survive 
in state custody: Would he live to die of natural causes or would he be executed, 
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and if executed, when? In that context, Dahmer's attorneys would slow the 
proceedings down as much as possible, both to make sure that they did 
whatever could be done in a case in which their client's life was at stake, and 
to postpone a judgment that could only hasten his death. 
The trial would be delayed by any number of possible pre-trial motions: 
to determine the present sanity of the defendant, to declare the applicable death 
penalty statute unconstitutional, to challenge the seizure of evidence from 
Dahmer's apartment, to suppress his confessions, to challenge the composition 
of the jury panel, and so on. Some of the rulings on these motions might be 
appealed before trial. As trial approached, the defense would probably try to 
obtain special procedures to insure the impartiality of the jury: a change of 
venue, special (and time consuming) procedures in jury selection, a further long 
delay, and so forth. The impartiality of the jury was a comparatively minor 
concern in Dahmer's actual trial last January, in part because relatively few 
issues were in dispute. In addition, Dahmer's chief defense attorney (who did 
not ask for a change of venue) said publicly before trial that "The police and 
prosecutors here [have] worked to limit the effects of pre-trial publicity that 
could bias jurors" (Associated Press 1991 ). Perhaps the police and prosecutors 
would behave as well in the heat of a capital trial, but perhaps not. Certainly 
that sort of professional courtesy and cooperation between the sides is less 
common in capital prosecutions. For example, before the trial of Robert Alton 
Harris in San Diego, California, in 1978, the District Attorney not only fanned 
public outrage by telling the press that the "death penalty is designed to deal 
with this kind of offense," but engaged in a well publicized battle with the local 
United States Attorney for the privilege of bringing Harris to trial first. 1 
A capital trial of Jeffrey Dahmer (beginning perhaps a year or two after 
the arrest) would be a vast event. Jury selection alone could easily take longer 
than the sanity trial that actually occurred. In addition, the state would have 
to prove that Dahmer committed each of 15 cruel, disgusting murders. Dahmer 
could hardly deny that he killed any of his victims-the physical evidence was 
overwhelming-but the prosecution might not have an easy time proving that 
he killed each of them, let alone that he did so with "malice aforethought" 
and with "premeditation and deliberation." Weeks, if not months, would be 
consumed reviewing his atrocities in detail-pictures of mutilated bodies and 
body parts, testimony from pathologists and criminologists, descriptions of 
how the remains were found, evidence of bite marks and knife wounds-all 
to a packed press gallery, if not on live television. Some of this did happen 
in the sanity trial that in fact occurred, but not nearly as much. Along the 
way there would be numerous objections and arguments and disputes about 
evidence and procedure, which would fuel future appeals. Everybody 
involved-the police, the prosecutors, the judge, the defense attorneys, the city 
administration, perhaps the jurors, perhaps even some of the victims or their 
kin-would come in for their fair share of abuse. 
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At the end of the trial, Dahmer undoubtedly would be found guilty on all 
or most counts-at the cost of millions of dollars and incalculable additional 
suffering. Then his sanity would have to be determined-as it was in real life. 
In this scenario, however, that too would be a much slower, more contentious 
and more expensive proceeding. Finally-if (as I expect) he was found to be 
sane-there would be a penalty trial, probably before the same jury.2 
The penalty proceeding in Dahmer's actual case was short: Nine relatives 
of victims spoke about their sorrow, pain, and anger, and Dahmer himself 
spoke briefly (Associated Press 1992a). A capital penalty trial would be very 
different. The victims' relatives would be allowed to speak, as they did, but 
much more would ride on their statements. 3 As a result, the defense attorneys 
would have the right to cross-examine the bereaved survivors. Some of them 
might not want Dahmer to be executed; that division could surface. (On the 
other hand, if some of the victims' relatives told the jury that they did want 
him to be executed, that could be a basis for a later reversal on appeal.4) In 
addition, the defense would probably present testimony from psychiatrists and 
psychologists who would describe Dahmer's obvious mental pathologies in 
elaborate detail; the prosecution would counter with its own psychiatrists and 
psychologists. The waves of destruction that a capital trial can generate would 
continue to spread. Dahmer's childhood and his upbringing would be 
scrutinized. If there is any pain or humiliation that his parents and relatives 
have in fact been spared, they would not escape it in a capital case. 
And then Dahmer would be sentenced. If he were not sentenced to death, 
there would be fury, frustration, recriminations, perhaps even violence. If he 
were sentenced to die, at least the prosecution would have achieved its goal. 
But it would not be over, not nearly. 
The Dahmer case was a traumatic crisis for Milwaukee. The police were 
charged with racism and homophobia for their handling of an incident on May 
27, 1991, when two officers brought a dazed young victim back to Dahmer, 
who killed him as soon as the officers left. That incident, and other aspects 
of the police conduct, provoked bitter racial and political disputes. Mter the 
verdict, various civic leaders expressed hope that there would now be an end 
to the national and international publicity the case generated, and to the 
divisions it provoked (Worthington 1992). A full capital trial would not only 
delay that conclusion, it would pour salt on the wounds all around. And then 
(unlike the actual case) Dahmer would appeal. 
Procedurally, the process of appellate review of a death sentence is quite 
complex. First, Dahmer would be entitled to direct review of the trial record 
by the state supreme court; if he lost, he could petition the United States 
Supreme Court to review that appeal by a writ of certiorari. If the Supreme 
Court declined to do so, he could file a petition in a state court (usually a state 
trial court) for "collateral" or "post-conviction" review, raising issues that c;ould 
not be determined in the first round of appeals. A typical issue at this stage 
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is that the defendant's trial (or appellate) attorneys were ineffective-a claim 
that frequently cannot be addressed on the trial record alone. State collateral 
review is extremely variable. The initial proceeding might be over in hours, 
and it might take years. If Dahmer lost again at that stage, he could probably 
appeal to a state appellate court-perhaps even to two levels of state appellate 
courts-and then, again, seek discretionary review from the United States 
Supreme Court. Finally (if he lost at every stage up to this point) he could 
petition for federal collateral review by filing a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in a federal district court. If that petition was denied, he could appeal 
to a federal court of appeals, and then ask the Supreme court for certiorari 
review a third time. If his third petition to the Supreme Court was denied, 
Dahmer could file new ("successive'') petitions for collateral review in state and 
federal courts, and (if necessary) appeals from the denials of these petitions. 
Successive petitions are increasingly disfavored, but they still succeed 
sometimes, at least temporarily. 
For the most part, any convicted prisoner has these same appellate options.5 
But there are four differences. First, traditionally, courts are more careful in 
reviewing claims of error in capital cases. There is a strong norm that is still 
widely shared (except, perhaps, by the United States Supreme Court) that a 
defendant who is facing death is entitled to a higher level of due process than 
one who is merely at risk oflosing time or money.6 
Second, a non-capital sentence can be implemented before appellate review 
is complete. Some convicted defendants are allowed to remain free on bail 
pending direct appeal (Glaberson 1992) but others are remanded to custody 
(New York Times 1992); almost all remain imprisoned during the pendency 
of collateral review proceedings. Indeed, many defendants don't even make 
bail before trial, and remain in custody from arrest through the completion 
of their sentences. Murder defendants are particularly unlikely to be released 
on bail at any stage, since the sum of money required (if bail is set at all) is 
usually prohibitive. One way or another, a sentence of imprisonment may be 
over by the time the federal courts complete their review of a habeas corpus 
petition in a non-capital case; post-conviction delay favors the state. By 
contrast, appellate review of any sort is impossible after a prisoner is executed-
the case is moot-so death sentences must be stayed during collateral 
proceedings as well as on direct appeals. As a result, the incentive to pursue 
all avenues of review is much greater for a defendant under sentence of death. 
Third, non-capital defendants have limited access to lawyers. Every 
defendant has the right to an appointed attorney on direct appeal, 7 but there 
is no such right for collateral review,8 and very few prisoners who are not on 
death row can afford to hire lawyers. Prisoners with death sentences, however, 
are almost always represented by attorneys throughout this process, frequently 
by first-rate volunteer lawyers. 
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Fourth, capital trials, and the appeals that follow, are typically far longer 
and more complex than those in other cases, even non-capital murder trials. 
If Dahmer's capital trial followed the course I have described, it might take 
a year to three years simply to complete the record for the first appeal. After 
that, the process of reading the record and writing the briefs might take another 
six months to a year, perhaps longer. This sounds slow-it is slow-but the 
trial records in comparable cases often consist of ten- to twenty-thousand pages 
of transcript, plus reams and boxes of exhibits, and the initial appeals often 
raise dozens of separate legal issues. 
After the case is briefed, the state supreme court would schedule oral 
argument. This might entail another six- or twelve- or twenty-month delay, 
depending on the backlog of other capital and non-capital cases. Eventually, 
the court would hear the arguments and reach a decision-after another lengthy 
delay during which the judges and their staff digest the small mountain of paper 
such a case generates, analyze and decide the issues, and come to terms with 
their own feelings about this horror. They could reverse Dahmer's murder 
convictions (or some of them) or they could affirm the convictions and reverse 
the sentence. Overall, perhaps 50 percent of death sentences (or the underlying 
convictions) are reversed on initial appeal, a far higher reversal rate than in 
other criminal cases.9 Dahmer's appeal could present excellent grounds for 
reversal, in a case as complex and messy as this one would be, there is plenty 
of room for misconduct, unfairness, and error. Nonetheless, I expect that his 
death sentence (like those of most serial murderers) would be affirmed. 
If the death sentence were affirmed at this initial review (perhaps four years 
after the verdict, perhaps longer) the process would continue. In general, the 
likelihood of success by the defense diminishes at each successive stage that 
follows direct review, but there are quite a few separate steps, and the chance 
of winning something somewhere is still substantial. Equally important, each 
stage takes time-some more, some less. If there is a reversal at any point, 
the case is sent back to an earlier point in the process-for a habeas corpus 
hearing by the federal district court, for a redetermination of an issue on appeal 
by the state supreme court, for a new penalty trial in the state trial court, and 
so forth-and restarts from that point. Any time this happens the state has 
to decide whether to throw in the towel and settle for a life sentence, or start 
up the hill again. In "ordinary" capital cases the prosecutors frequently decide 
to give up the quest after an appellate setback. In Dahmer's case the prosecution 
would never give up, in part because every visible event would produce a new 
wave of publicity, new anger, new recriminations-and renewed suffering for 
the survivors of all the victims. 
How would it end? Perhaps, after five or ten years Dahmer would have his 
death sentence reversed and reduced to life imprisonment. This is the same 
sentence he in fact received last February, but it would not carry the same 
meaning; it would cause an explosion of pain and anger. Many who were 
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satisfied when he was sentenced to the maximum penalty-life-would be 
furious that he only received life when death was possible. They would feel 
devalued, humiliated, cheated-and it's easy to understand why considering 
the enormous costs of achieving this outcome, and comparing Dahmer's crimes 
to those of other murderers who are occasionally put to death. 
On the other hand, Dahmer might someday be executed. That possibility, 
presumably, is the only justification for this entire process. Perhaps his death 
would afford some satisfaction to the relatives of his victims, but could that 
satisfaction possibly make up for the years of gratuitous agony they would 
have endured? What they need is an end. On April 21, 1992, Robert Alton 
Harris became the first person to be executed in California in 25 years. The 
day before the execution, a CNN television news report on the mother of one 
of the victims stated that "[her) grief began nearly 14 years ago when her son 
Michael and his friend John Mayeski were killed by Robert Alton Harris. Over 
the years her pain has gotten worse instead of better, as Harris's execution 
dates came and went." The report quotes the mother as saying: "It's time that 
this particular case came to an end. It's been inhumane and terrible anguish 
for the family members, and we want peace."10 
And when would this final act take place? There is no saying. There were 
2,729 prisoners on death rows in the United States, as of April, 1993.11 About 
250 new death sentences are meted out each year. In 1992 31 prisoners were 
executed, the highest total since 1962. 12 As of September 1992, the average 
stay on death row for all prisoners executed since 1976 was eight years and 
five months; for those executed since 1989 it is over ten years, and many are 
on death row for crimes that took place twelve years ago, or longer, and yet 
they have no execution dates in sight. 13 Probably, most death row inmates will 
never be executed. There is no plausible way to estimate the likely delay for 
a defendant who is sentenced to death in 1993, and who is among the minority 
of such defendants who are destined for execution. The best description is that 
he will remain in limbo and his case will remain open indefinitely. 
*** 
Obviously, Jeffrey Dahmer is not typical of homicide defendants, and a 
capital trial in his case would not be typical of capital trials. Most capital cases 
are simpler, cheaper, and less promiscuously agonizing. The scenario I have 
sketched shows what the death penalty can do to a homicide case, under 
extreme circumstances. Often there are fewer steps to the process-or they are 
less carefully executed-for reasons that are as arbitrary and unfair as any other 
aspect of the system: because the defendant was inadequately represented at 
trial or on appeal, or because, in the later stages of review, he was not 
represented at all. In general, however, cases that are less expensive and less 
excruciating than Dahmer's to begin with are subject to the same range of 
distorting effects that I have described, but on a smaller scale. 
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Although cases like Dahmer's are rare, they are central to any discussion 
of capital punishment. These are the crimes for which there is the strongest 
consensus that the punishment should be death, and these are the defendants 
who are most likely to be sentenced to death-and sometimes executed. It's 
important to consider the damage the death penalty can do in those situations 
in which we want it most. Other capital cases may be less costly, in every respect, 
but they are also much more likely to fall by the wayside because the prosecution 
accepts a plea bargain to life imprisonment, or the jury convicts of second degree 
murder or sentences the defendant to life imprisonment, or the state gives up 
after the case is reversed and remanded on appeal, or the case simply lingers 
and is forgotten somewhere in the long queue leading to the gallows. 
The fmancial cost of pursuing a capital prosecution through to execution is 
high; by all estimates, considerably higher than the cost of a non-capital murder 
conviction followed by imprisonment for life (Nakell 1982, Garey 1985, 
Spangenberg and Walsh 1989). But that expense-multiplied by 10, or 20, or 30 
executions a year -captures only a small fraction of the price of running a capital 
sentencing system. For every murderer who is executed there may be ten on death 
row who will never be executed, and as many again who were convicted of capital 
murder but not sentenced to death, and a comparable group who were tried for 
capital murder and convicted of lesser offenses or acquitted entirely, and two or 
three dozen defendants who were charged with capital murder but who were tried 
for-or allowed to plead guilty to-less serious charges. In each of these cases 
(and there are thousands a year) we pay some proportion of the added costs of 
an execution-less when the process is aborted early, more the closer it approaches 
the ostensible goal. The total cost of using the death penalty is exorbitant, by all 
estimates. In 1988, for example, the Miami Herald reported that since 1973 the 
state had spent over $57 million on capital punishment and executed 18 prisoners, 
at a cost of over $3.2 million apiece (von Drehle 1988a). In states with fewer 
executions, the costs per head are necessarily higher. In 1987 the Kansas legislature 
rejected the death penalty for financial reasons. A budgetary analysis prepared 
for the legislature estimated that the added expense would be $10 million in the 
first year, and at least $50 million before the first execution took place several 
years down the road (Prejean 1988; von Drehle 1988b). 
Money can be counted. It provides a measure of the magnitude of an 
enterprise, and in this case the measure is startling. Still, we are a rich country. 
We can afford to spend $200 million, or even half a billion dollars a year on 
death sentences, if we want to. The personal and social costs of the process 
are not quantifiable, but they may be harder to bear. 
VENGEANCE AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE 
Why would anyone even consider a death penalty regime of the sort we now 
have? The wisdom of law makers of Wisconsin, of Kansas, of Michigan, of 
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West Virginia, seems so obvious. And yet these states are in a minority. Why? 
There are two parts to the question. First: Why do so many people want 
the death penalty at all? Second: Having chosen to use the death penalty, why 
have we ended up with this Kafkaesque system to implement it? 
The most telling answer to the first question is the simplest and most natural: 
People want the death penalty for revenge. 
Vengeance has an ambiguous position in our culture. In more liberal times, 
many would disclaim the desire for revenge as a justification for punishment: 
it seemed too cruel, barbaric, inhumane, selfish, pessimistic. To many, vengeance 
is un-Christian. A liberal and civilized people should not seek revenge but 
improvement, ofthe offender or of society (Allen 1981, pp. 4-8; Allen 1959). Even 
now, in a more conservative era when revenge is regularly described as a 
justification for punishment, it is cleansed and renamed "retribution." The change 
is telling; it removes the subject from the description. "Revenge" is what the 
avenger wreaks; "retribution" is simply what happens to the wrong-doer. 
Revenge is not the only possible justification for capital punishment. Most 
people who favor capital punishment also believe that it deters homicide. 14 
Deterring killing (unlike revenge) is a universally acceptable objective. 15 This 
would be a powerful justification for the death penalty, if true. But it is not, 
in two senses. First (although I will not describe the evidence in this context), 
there is no systematic evidence that the death penalty for murder does deter 
homicide to a greater extent than lengthy periods of imprisonment. On the 
contrary, the best evidence suggests that it has no effect on homicide rates 
(Hood 1989, pp. 117-148; Lempert 1981; Zimring and Hawkins 1986, pp. 167-
186), and a few studies hint that it might increase the number of murders 
(Bowers and Pierce 1980). Second, belief in deterrence is not the basis for the 
position of most proponents of capital punishment -two-thirds or more, when 
asked if they would continue to support the death penalty if it were proven 
to have no deterrent effect, say "Yes" (Ellsworth and Ross 1983, p. 147; Gallup 
and Newport, see note 14). In a 1991 Gallup poll, supporters were asked why 
they favor the death penalty; 50% said "A life for a life," but only 13 percent 
said "It is a deterrent" (Gallup and Newport, see note 14). 
I have no difficulty understanding the desire for revenge, even deadly 
revenge. When I read about cases like Dahmer's-a vicious predator who 
raped, tortured, killed, and dismembered helpless victims, some of them mere 
children-one of my reactions is "Kill the bastard." If a relative of a victim 
did kill him, I would feel a great deal of sympathy for that relative, and little, 
if any, for Dahmer. But we do not allow relatives to avenge their dead, not 
even in egregious cases, and state-administered capital punishment is a poor 
vehicle for vengeance (Lempert 1981, pp. 1185-1187). 
A personal act of vengeance, properly executed, is timely, personal, and 
passionate-the grieving father tracking down and killing the killer of his child. 
The death penalty, as we use it, is not personal vengeance. The impulse to kill 
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those who kill our kin is surely the root of the institution, and an execution 
may satisfy the diffuse desire for revenge that many people feel after any murder 
in proportion to its proximity and its cruelty. But an execution is a collective 
act embodying a social judgment that killers (or some of them) should be killed 
by the state, and the main retributive justifications for executions are more 
abstract and elaborate: to reaffirm fundamental values, to exclude and separate 
us from those who break sacred bonds, to balance moral accounts. The process 
by which we carry out this judgment has little in common with the conduct 
of an avenger. It is slow, passionless, impersonal-unreliable, and rare. And 
that brings us to the second question: Why do we have the bizarre death penalty 
apparatus I have described? 
Part of the problem is that we feel that we have to take great care to insure 
that the death penalty is used fairly. The most basic concern is to avoid errors. 
Nobody wants a part in executing an innocent person (and it does happen) 
(Bedau and Radelet 1987). More frequently, the possible errors are smaller, 
or at least more slippery. What role did the defendant play in the killing? Was 
he acting in self defense?16 Did his intentions constitute "malice''? Did they 
amount to "premeditation''? To what extent was he provoked? How intoxicated 
was he? Was he legally insane? 
If capital punishment were restricted to serial killers, these questions might 
not be very troubling. Obviously Jeffrey Dahmer(or John Gacy, or Ted Bundy) 
acted with "malice" and "premeditation" (if these terms mean anything), 
without provocation and under no threat of personal danger. In addition, most 
people probably don't care whether a serial murderer is insane; they want him 
killed just the same. But our death penalty laws are not restricted to the rare, 
extreme, and bizarre murders. A capital trial is much more likely to involve 
an addict who kills a checkout clerk at a convenience store. In that context, 
the jury's judgment may well turn on uncertain and disputed evidence, or on 
slippery interpretations. 
There is no apparent best way to avoid errors in criminal prosecutions. The 
American method is an adversarial system of adjudication, set in the 
constitutional framework of the Bill of Rights and the due-process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, for better or for worse, a system that relies 
heavily on procedural devices to guarantee fairness and accuracy (Gross 1987). 
An accused has no particular right to a careful and thorough investigation by 
the police. He does, however, have rights to counsel, to remain silent, to privacy, 
to an impartial jury, to confront his accusers, to present a defense, and so on. 
These rights may be implemented by judicial action at every stage-pre-trial, 
trial, post-trial, appeal, collateral review. All this takes time, but we can hardly 
deny these rights to those defendants who stand to lose the most simply because 
time (for a change) is on their side. In the heat of the moment in some mind-
numbing case we may want to drag the culprit straight out and hang him; but 
when that passion subsides we will still believe that those the state wishes to 
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kill are entitled to at least the same level of procedural care and due process 
as other defendants-and probably more. 
Factual errors are not the only problem. Through the 1980s, about 20,000 
Americans were killed in criminal homicides each year, and nearly that many 
were arrested for killing them (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1981-1990). Of 
these, fewer than 2 percent were sentenced to death. 17 Were these 200 to 300 
a year really the most heinous murderers we caught? Or were they chosen by 
chance, or, worse, because of some impermissible criteria-race, poverty, the 
race of their victims, and so forth? Walter Berns, an articulate advocate for 
capital punishment, has summarized the problem well: However strongly one 
may favor the death penalty in principle, its propriety in practice "depends 
on our ability to restrict its use to the worst of our criminals and to impose 
it in a nondiscriminatory fashion" (Berns 1980). 
The dangers of arbitrariness and discrimination are not restricted to capital 
punishment. The penalties for burglary and shoplifting also vary a great deal, 
and may also turn on illegitimate considerations. In this context, however, these 
problems are at their worst, for three reasons. 
Infrequency. Again, if we limited the death penalty to serial murders, we 
could probably do a decent job of identifying capital homicides and imposing 
death sentences uniformly. Instead, most death-penalty states select a small 
number of capital cases from a large and amorphous range of death-eligible 
crimes. 18 Many are at risk, but few are condemned. As a result, every potentially 
capital case is subject to a series of discretionary choices-by the police, the 
prosecutor, the judge, the jury-each of which might be based on happenstance 
or bias. 
Salience. The death penalty is a troubling and divisive institution. A 
substantial minority still oppose it in principle19 -while very few have similar 
qualms about imprisonment-and those who favor the death penalty are 
divided about when and how to use it. Some people experience equally strong 
internal conflicts. Those who do not have strong and well-defined views about 
the death penalty may be especially torn if they are required to decide the fate 
of a particular defendant. As a result, life or death may turn on the identity 
of the prosecutor, the jurors, or the judge, or on their reactions to peculiar 
incidental facts. For example, the most memorable fact of Robert Alton 
Harris's crimes is that after he killed his two teenage victims, he ate the 
hamburgers they had bought from Jack-in-the-Box. This incident was 
mentioned repeatedly in news stories throughout the fourteen-year life of the 
case; it almost certainly influenced the jury that sentenced him. 20 How much 
does this 5-second sound bite tell us about Harris? Would he have deserved 
death any less if he had bought his lunch himself! 
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juries. Jury sentencing is uncommon for non-capital crimes in the United 
States, but it is the rule in capital cases. In other words, the hardest and most 
discretionary sentencing decisions are made by ad-hoc panels of one-time lay 
decision makers-hardly a process calculated to minimize arbitrariness and 
discrimination. And yet we believe that jury sentencing plays an important rule 
in legitimating the death penalty, and ensuring that its use reflects community 
values.21 
The sum of the effects of these forces is a depressing fact: Consistency in 
criminal sentencing is least likely in decisions on life and death, where it matters 
most. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of evidence that race and chance 
both play large roles in determining who is sentenced to death in the United 
States, and who is spared (Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski 1990; Gross and 
Mauro 1989). 
Judges and legislators are aware of this problem. They have tried to correct 
it, or at least contain it, by creating an array of procedural devices that are 
designed to produce even-handed, nondiscriminatory capital sentencing. All 
states are required to conduct elaborate, trial-like capital penalty hearings;22 
many also engage in post-verdict "proportionality review" of death sentences. 23 
These procedures may or may not have any useful effect; they certainly are 
not entirely successful. One way or another, they do take time-to prepare, 
to schedule, to conduct, and to review. Equally important, the knowledge that 
many prisoners on death row have been unfairly or arbitrarily singled out adds 
weight to other procedural claims, and moves judges to review death cases more 
carefully, and less expeditiously. 
Perhaps executions could be speeded up, somewhat. I can imagine that we 
could contrive to conduct most of them within 5 years of arrest, rather than 
10 or 12. If we try to go much faster than that we will have to dismantle the 
procedural core of our system of criminal justice-a structure that was created 
largely to protect defendants-in order to expedite the cases of those defendants 
who have the greatest need of protection. This cuts strongly against the grain; 
it will not happen. Given that limitation, there is relatively little incentive to 
accelerate the process at all, since even a five- or six-year delay in killing is 
enough to gut the meaning of revenge. The man you wanted to kill was the 
abusive robber, high on crack, who pistol whipped and shot two customers 
at a Seven-Eleven store in 1984. Instead, in 1990, the state electrocutes a 
balding, religious model prisoner in a neat blue-denim uniform. 
Consider two stylized capital punishment systems. System /: We grab every 
person who commits a murder and quickly kill them. System II: We (equally 
efficiently) grab every person who commits a murder and put them into a 
holding pen. Mter five years we empty out the pen and decide which of the 
inmates to kill. System I has a harsh, old-testament quality, but if you want. 
revenge, it might seem right. The execution is a direct response to the murder. 
System II, however, is a closer approximation of what we actually do, and 
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must do; but in this version the task is very different. It's not just the wait, 
it's the process of choosing who will die and who will live: Death is now served 
by a repetitive, comparative, untrustworthy, selection procedure. Is it any 
wonder that the enthusiasm to kill so often withers? 
Delay, arbitrariness, and discrimination are only part of the problem. State 
sponsored executions are not only slow, uneven and unpredictable, they are 
also impersonal. We are willing to kill murderers, but we do not want anyone 
to derive satisfaction from doing it. We would never consider turning a prisoner 
over to private executioners with a personal stake in his death-the victim's 
relatives or neighbors for example. We recoil even at the idea of a public 
executioner who enjoys his work. The British Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment expressed this feeling almost forty years ago: "(T]he ambition that 
prompts an average of five applications a week for the post of hangman, and 
the craving that draws a crowd to the prison where a notorious murderer is 
being executed, reveal psychological qualities of a sort that no state would wish 
to foster in its citizens" (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1953). 
Judge Parker of Arkansas, one of the famous hanging judges of the 
American frontier, is supposed to have said on his death bed "I never hanged 
a man. It is the law" (Gregory and Strickland 1971). Some advocates of the 
death penalty may feel comfortable with a more personal role, and some who 
speak in Judge Parker's terms may be hypocrites. Nonetheless, this is the 
dominant ideology, and it is treated with respect. We execute people because 
we must, because "it is the law," and not because we like to do it. 
The same ideology applies to other criminal penalties, and it is undercut 
by similar violations. We know that some cops are brutal, and some prison 
guards are sadistic, but we do not approve. Occasionally (as in the Rodney 
King case) they are caught (if not always punished). The problem becomes 
much more acute, however, when the state authorizes the imposition of a 
penalty that is inherently painful and cruel. We would confront a similar 
difficulty if we continued to employ flogging, or ear cropping: how to find 
agents who will administer the punishment, and yet derive no joy from the 
suffering they inflict. 
One of the oddities of capital punishment in America is the search for a 
"painless" method of killing, as if the pain of a swift execution could compare 
to the terror of life under a sentence of death (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, pp. 
107-125). I wonder if it is not this ambivalence in our attitude toward executioners, 
rather than an abstract desire to avoid causing pain, that drives the movement 
to substitute lethal injection for electrocution, hanging, and poison gas. 
In 1973, then-Governor Reagan of California captured the essence of the 
argument for this new method: 
Being a former farmer and horse raiser, I know what it's like to try to eliminate an injured 
horse by shooting him. Now you call the veterinarian and the vet gives it a shot. ... [M]aybe 
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we should review and see if there aren't more humane methods [of execution]-the simple 
shot or tranquilizer (Schwartzchild 1982). 
This is an appealing comparison-so neat and easy-but it is terribly 
misleading. A condemned man, strapped to a gurney after an interminable wait, 
is not a horse with a broken leg; he knows what's going on. More important, 
Governor Reagan's homily is also terribly revealing. Euthanasia (even if, 
somehow, we could carry it off) is not execution. It's a necessary evil, something 
we do because the alternative is worse. A condemned prisoner does not present 
this unhappy choice. We can simply leave him in prison-where he has already 
spent years-with the thousands of others on death row and the multitudes 
in the general prison population. Once we start thinking in such terms, 
execution becomes a distasteful and unnecessary task, something to delay and 
avoid. 
The processes I have described feed on themselves, and on each other. To 
reduce errors in capital cases we generate new procedures; these procedures 
must be followed in future cases, which increases delay. As executions are 
delayed, they are increasingly drained of content as acts of revenge; as a result, 
it is increasingly easy to accept further delays, or to forego the killings 
altogether. As delays and reversals become more common, executions become 
increasingly rare; the rarer they are, the more likely it is that those who are 
killed will be the victims of bias or caprice-and the more distasteful the task 
of singling out and killing the few who will die. Rising concerns about 
discrimination and arbitrariness-and growing uneasiness with the whole 
process-generate new doubts, new procedures, new delays, and so on. 
AN AMERICAN DREAM 
The logic of the progression I have described seems inexorable. Several 
elements are required: monopolization of legitimate punishment by the state; 
widespread use of imprisonment; a commitment to fairness and procedural 
regularity in criminal prosecutions; cultural ambivalence about revenge in 
general and about the death penalty in particular. Once these are all in place, 
the expected pattern is simple: a decline in executions, followed by de facto 
or de jure abolition. And indeed this is exactly what has happened in every 
Western democracy, except one-the United States (Zimring and Hawkins 
1986, pp. 3-23). 
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the number of executions in the United 
States declined steadily (Bowers 1984, pp. 25-26). The highest rate was in 1935, 
when 199 prisoners were killed. In the 1940s, the totals dropped to the low 
lOOs; in the 1950s, they ranged from 49 to 105; by the mid-1960s there were 
a handful of executions a year; and in 1968 executions stopped. Four years 
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later the Supreme Court decided that all existing death sentences in the nation 
were unconstitutional. 24 
At that point, it looked as if the United States would follow the pattern 
of Western Europe, that a lengthy moratorium on executions would turn into 
permanent abolition. Instead, executions started up again in 1977. They have 
been going on in fits and starts ever since, with no end in sight. But the historical 
forces that produced the moratorium could not be entirely denied. They did 
not achieve abolition, but they had an effect. The apparently inevitable progress 
toward abolition was side-tracked into a macabre loop, the nightmarish 
structure we now use to eke out a dozen or two dozen killings each year. 
How did we come to this pass? The sequence of events that created our 
present death penalty apparatus is well known; I will describe it in only the 
sketchiest detail. The history can be divided into four stages: moratorium; first 
backlash; stalemate; second backlash. 
Moratorium. Starting in the mid-1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund spearheaded a drive to halt all executions in the United 
States (Meltzner 1974). The general strategy was to present constitutional 
challenges to every prospective execution, to obtain stays, to build up a large 
backlog of prisoners on death row, and ultimately to force the Supreme Court 
to consider a series of general challenges to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. The strategy worked extremely well. In 1965 there were 7 executions; 
in 1966, I; in 1967, 2; from 1968, on, none. The culmination of the moratorium 
drive came in 1972, in the case of Furman v. Georgia/5 when the Supreme 
Court vacated all death sentences then in effect-629 in all-on the ground 
that they had been imposed by a system that was arbitrary and capricious. 
First Backlash. At the time, Furman was widely interpreted as the judicial 
abolition of the capital punishment in the United States (Meltzner 1974, pp. 
286-316; Zimring and Hawkins 1986, pp. 37-41). In fact, the Furman decision 
(an extremely complex set of five separate concurring opinions) merely held 
that existing death penalty laws were unconstitutional. Furman was widely and 
angrily condemned by politicians and law enforcement officers (Zimring and 
Hawkins 1986, p. 38). State legislatures immediately started to write new death 
penalty laws that might satisfy the Supreme Court. By July 1976, 35 states 
had reenacted the death penalty/6 592 prisoners had been condemned to death 
(Greenberg 1982, p. 916), and public support for capital punishment had grown 
from 57 percent to 65 percent.27 At that point, in Gregg v. Georgia,28 the 
Supreme Court held that capital punishment was not inherently unconstitu-
tional, and approved several of the new death penalty laws that attempted to 
control the arbitrariness that had been condemned in Furman by "limiting" 
and "guiding" the discretion of the sentencers. 
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Stalemate. From July 1976 through June 1983 the death penalty was 
available in the United States, but essentially unused. Only seven executions 
were carried out in seven years, and in four of them the condemned men had 
voluntarily chosen to forego available appeals.29 To some extent, this near-
moratorium was a predictable short-term effect of the Supreme Court's 
decisions in 1976. In Gregg (and its companion cases) the Court not only 
approved a number of "guided discretion" death penalty statutes, it also 
declared "mandatory" death sentences unconstitutional. 30 As a result of that 
holding, courts overturned more that 400 death sentences between July 1976 
and October 1979 (Greenberg 1982, p. 916). In addition, a series of major 
Supreme Court cases after 1976 addressed a host of procedural issues that were 
left unresolved by Gregg; most of these cases were decided favorably to the 
defendants.31 With several major issues still unresolved, and with one or 
another usually pending before the Supreme Court, almost all executions were 
stayed. In the meantime, many lower federal courts were paying careful 
attention to the first crop of post-Gregg capital habeas corpus petitions, and, 
in most cases, finding reversible constitutional error in the state proceedings.32 
Second Backlash. By June 1983 it was clear that Gregg had not really 
restored the death penalty in America. It was not clear what would happen 
next. If matters had simply proceeded on the existing trajectory, the pace of 
executions would probably have picked up a bit as procedural problems were 
ironed out. On the other hand, the death penalty might have been abolished 
by stages, as the Supreme Court attempted to keep its impossible promise to 
eliminate arbitrariness and discrimination from capital punishment. Instead, 
the Court decided to take action to speed up the pace of executions. In a series 
of decisions starting in June, 1983, the Court eviscerated the procedural 
protections against arbitrariness that it had imposed in Gregg, 33 and approved 
expedited procedures for handling federal habeas corpus appeals.34 In later 
decisions, the Court precluded any plausible claim that a state's death penalty 
laws might be unconstitutional because of the arbitrary or discriminatory 
results they produce35 and made federal habeas corpus increasingly unavailable 
for any purpose. 36 The number of executions increased immediately: 4 from 
September through December of 1983; 21 in 1984; an average of 20 a year 
from 1984 through 1992.37 
While it's easy to describe how we arrived at our present system of using 
the death penalty, it's not so easy to explain why it happened. It would have 
made a lot of sense for the United States to move along the same path as 
Canada, Great Britain, France, and Germany. Instead, we find ourselves 
grouped with countries with whom we have far less in common, except the 
practice of execution: China, Iran, South Africa, the former Soviet Union.38 
Why? 
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An obvious explanation is the widespread public support for the death 
penalty in the United States, which recent polls measure at over 75 percent. 39 
But the public in Canada, Great Britain, France, and Germany also supported 
the death penalty at the time that it was abolished, and at levels that were 
comparable to the level of public support for the death penalty in America 
in 1976. Support for the death penalty has declined in some of these other 
countries, but it did so several years after abolition (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, 
pp. 10-22). What has made public opinion on this issue so much more powerful 
a force in the United States than in Europe or Canada? 
The use of the death penalty is not the only feature of our criminal justice 
system that sets us apart from other Western nations. We also imprison a far 
higher proportion of the population than any other industrial democracy 
(Mauer 1991). Both of these phenomena may be reactions to the unusually 
high rate of violent crime we suffer, a rate that climbed rapidly through the 
late 1960s and early l970s,just as the abolition movement was picking up steam 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1980-1990). To some extent, a higher crime 
rate produces a higher incarceration rate simply because there are more 
criminals to arrest. In the United States, that effect has been multiplied by a 
wave of punitiveness. We not only arrest more criminals than in the past, we 
imprison a higher proportion of those we arrest, and for longer and longer 
periods. This general punitiveness has undoubtedly contributed to the growing 
public support for capital punishment through the late 1970s and 1980s, and 
the increasing institutional commitment to it. 
Another factor that may help explain this history is the federal structure 
of the United States, and the fact that criminal justice is a function that is largely 
left to the states. To a great extent, the death penalty in America is a Southern 
institution. Since 1935, 63 percent of all executions in this country have been 
carried out in the South (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, p. 32); since 1976, 88 
percent.40 In several Southern states, the pro-death penalty backlash after 
Furman was extremely strong. In California, and perhaps elsewhere, the second 
(post-Gregg) backlash was equally powerful. The passionate opposition of 
some states may simply have made it impossible to abolish at the national level, 
either by Congress, or (as almost happened) by the Supreme Court. Perhaps 
the radical swings in our national policy on capital punishment simply reflect 
a 50- or 70-year time lag between the South (and some Western states), and 
the remainder of the nation. 
But probably the most basic reason for the restoration of capital punishment 
in the United States in 1976 is the politicization of issues of crime and justice. 
The high crime rate, the climate of punitiveness, and the fragmentation of a 
federal system, all played their parts, but they did so in a charged context. 
At first glance, it seems odd that whenever the death penalty has been 
abolished in a Western country, it would have been retained if the matter had 
been put to a public vote. But is it? The general public in every democracy 
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always wants things that are bad policy or impossible for the government to 
provide: lower taxes, higher social benefits, cheaper gasoline, the execution 
of murderers. Some public demands become effective political issues, others 
do not. At the moment, for example, popular pressure to reduce official 
perquisites has changed the workings of Congress, and may cost many 
incumbents their seats. By contrast, the setting of interest rates has been largely 
removed from the electoral arena in the United States-a pattern held even 
in the early 1980s, when interest rates over 15 percent caused massive economic 
dislocations. If our system for operating the death penalty had been left to 
function and develop outside the realm of electoral politics, it would have 
collapsed under its own weight. But it wasn't. 
Crime has been high on the political agenda in United States for decades. 
One reason may be the unusual democratization of our criminal justice system. 
Unlike continental countries, we use juries of common citizens to try criminal 
cases, and to sentence in capital cases. Most state-court judges are elected, as 
are almost all state prosecutors-a practice that is virtually unknown elsewhere. 
Most of our police officers are employed by local governments, and subject 
to local political control. A public that is accustomed to choosing judges and 
prosecutors, and to playing an direct role in the operation of the system they 
run, may also expect to set the policies they implement. In a period of rising 
crime rates, public pressure is likely to become increasingly insistent. 
This sort of demand is irresistible in the undisciplined context of American 
politics. The reigning wisdom of electoral politics is to tell the public what it 
wants to hear. For several years, our national leaders have been tripping over 
each other in their haste to commit themselves to simultaneously eliminate the 
federal budget deficit, preserve social security benefits, and impose no new 
taxes. These are politically dangerous fictions; they impinge directly on the 
lives of most people, and the inevitable failures and broken promises are visible. 
Criminal justice issues, on the other hand, are abstractions for most of the 
electorate. Even those who are victimized by crime have no way of appreciating 
the consequences of different policies on incarceration. Attitudes toward the 
death penalty in particular are almost entirely symbolic (Ellsworth and Ross 
1983, pp. 161-165) since, despite our high homicide rate, few people have any 
personal contact with murder. 
There is no significant organized constituency that opposes draconian 
punishments. No American politician risks losing support by endorsing longer 
sentences for drug offenses, or mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, 
or the death penalty-and sometimes they seem to gain. Predictably, many 
candidates run for governor, or for President, or for mayor of New York City, 
on their support for capital punishment and for other punitive measures. Being 
"tough on crime" puts you on the right side-even if there is no other side-
at almost no risk. The costs of these policies are rarely immediately apparent; 
sometimes they take years to surface. As for their effectiveness, since most 
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people have little or no contact with courts and prisons they can simply be 
told that a new system of punishment has made a difference. Worse, they can 
come to believe that executing so many dozens, or imprisoning so many 
thousands, are accomplishments in themselves. 
And then, there is the question of race. Crime in the United States is a deeply 
racial issue. Blacks-black men-commit a disproportionate number of the 
violent crimes in this country. They constitute about half of our prison 
population, a rate of imprisonment nearly seven times that of white men 
(Blumstein 1982). For the most part, the victims of black violence in general-
and of black homicide in particular-are also blacks, usually black men. 
Nonetheless, the image of the black criminal has become the focus for white 
fear and hatred, and a political weapon that has been used to great effect. The 
best example is the notorious, cynical and successful use of black murderer 
Willie Horton by George Bush in his 1988 presidential campaign against 
Michael Dukakis. The medium was a political appeal for tougher law 
enforcement, but the message was unmistakably racial: we (the Republicans) 
are the party of the whites, they (the Democrats) are the party of black 
criminals. The usual defense against this coded racial charge is the one relied 
on by Bill Clinton in his 1992 campaign for president: I may be a democrat 
but I'm for the death penalty; in fact I've signed death warrants for two 
prisoners who were executed just this year. 
It is instructive to compare the recent history of the death penalty in Great 
Britain and in California. The use of capital punishment in Great Britain has 
been debated many times since the end of the Second World War. In 1948, 
the House of Commons passed a measure (the Silverman Amendment) 
suspending the death penalty for murder for five years; the measure was 
defeated in the House of Lords, and, in the absence of active government 
support, died (Christoph 1962, pp. 35-75). However, in 1949, in response to 
the public controversy over the issue, the Government appointed a Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment, to consider "whether the liability under 
the criminal law to suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited 
or modified." The Commission issued a Report in 1953, which was critical of 
the existing procedures for handling capital cases. In its Report, the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment noted that "The wider issue of whether 
capital punishment should be retained or abolished was not referred to us." 
Nonetheless, it observed that "in Great Britain, with its largely industrial 
population of fifty millions, the average annual number of executions during 
the past half-century has been only about thirteen. It is clear that a stage has 
been reached where there is little room for further limitation short of abolition" 
(Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1953, p. 212). 
In 1955, in the aftermath of the publication of the Royal Commission on 
Capital Punishment Report, an abolitionist amendment was narrowly defeated 
in the House of Commons. In 1956 a similar motion was passed by the 
90 SAMUEL R. GROSS 
Commons; once again, in the absence of Government support, it died in the 
House of Lords. As a compromise, however, the Government offered the 
Homicide Act, which was passed and became law in 1957, and which greatly 
narrowed the availability of the death penalty. From 1957 through 1964, the 
average number of executions a year dropped from twelve to five (Hollis 1964, 
p. 58). In 1965, the Murder Act suspended capital punishment experimentally 
for five years; in 1969 abolition was made permanent. 
Throughout this period public support for the death penalty remained 
strong. In November, 1947, a Gallup poll found that 65 percent supported 
capital punishment, and several polls found that at least that proportion 
disapproved of the Silverman Amendment (Hollis 1964, pp. 43, 53-57). In 1965, 
Gallup found that only 23 percent favored abolition, and in 1966-after 
suspension-76 percent favored reintroduction. In the 1970s, after permanent 
abolition, support for the death penalty increased. In 1975, for example, 82 
percent supported capital punishment for terrorists and bombers. This level 
of support continued into the 1980s. In 1983, for instance, majorities of 77 
percent and 74 percent, respectively, favored the death penalty for terrorist 
murders and for "murdering someone just for the fun of it"; nonetheless, 65 
percent thought that capital punishment would not in fact be brought back 
into use.41 And indeed, bills to reinstate the death penalty have been debated 
and defeated in parliament a dozen times since 1969-most recently in 
December 1990, by an overwhelming majority (Moncrieff 1990). 
Abolition was possible in Great Britain, despite public opinion, because there 
capital punishment has long been considered a "question of conscience" which 
is not suitable for treatment as a "political" issue. This tradition has two 
consequences. First, with rare exceptions, bills dealing with capital punishment 
have been presented to the House of Commons on "free votes" in which party 
discipline is suspended, and members can act as they choose. Thus, for example, 
bills to restore the death penalty were defeated repeatedly during the 
administration of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, despite her personal 
support (e.g., Chicago Tribune 1987). Second, "no political party, and few 
individual candidates, would think it proper, or wise, to base an appeal to the 
electorate on specific moral views [such as those on capital punishment), 
however relevant those views in fact are likely to be to future legislative 
activities .... " (Buxton 1973, p. 231) This is not to say that individual members 
of parliament have never been subject to political pressure on account of their 
views on capital punishment. Some have, but on a scale that is minuscule by 
American standards, and the issue has never been central to any major electoral 
campaign (Buxton 1973, p. 241). After the latest vote in parliament some 
analysts said that the question may now be closed forever. The most recent 
Gallup poll (April1992) still shows a majority in favor of death for terrorists 
and bombers, but a dwindling majority-66 percent.42 Perhaps public opinion 
in Great Britain is beginning to fall into place behind public policy. 
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The recent political history of capital punishment in California begins on 
February 18, 1972. On that date, four months before Furman, in the case of 
People v. Anderson,43 the California Supreme Court became the first court 
in the world to judicially abolish the death penalty, under the California State 
constitution. Within weeks a petition to amend the state constitution had 
gathered enough signatures to place the issue on the ballot, and in November, 
1972, a referendum to permit the use of the death penalty was approved by 
67 percent of the voters (Poulous 1990, pp. 170-71). Pursuant to this 
referendum, the state legislature passed a new death penalty law in 1973; it 
was declared unconstitutional in 1976, under Gregg v. Georgia, because it 
provided for mandatory capital sentencing.44 In 1977, the legislature enacted 
a new "guided discretion" death penalty statute that was sponsored and backed 
by then state senator George Deukmejian. 
In 1978, George Deukmajian was elected Attorney General of California, 
running in large part on his role in promoting capital punishment. In the same 
general election, 72 percent of the voters approved a referendum that replaced 
the 1976 statute with a "tougher" death penalty law. In 1982 Deukmejian was 
elected Governor. In 1986, he led a successful campaign to defeat Chief Justice 
Rose Bird and two liberal Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court, 
whose appointments by the preceding governor had to be confirmed in a 
general election. This enabled him to reshape and dominate that court in one 
fell swoop. Although Deukmejian and his allies had numerous quarrels with 
the decisions of the Bird court on business, tort and environmental issues, the 
campaign focussed entirely on the justices' records in deciding capital appeals 
(e.g., Clifford 1986). Indeed, the argument against the justices consisted oflittle 
more than a single well publicized fact: Chief Justice Bird had voted to reverse 
each of the sixty-one death sentences she had reviewed. 
The new California Supreme Court-under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Malcolm Lucas, a Deukmejian appointee-affirmed 97 of the first 124 death 
sentences it considered; as of May 3, 1991, it had affirmed 27 consecutive death 
sentences (Hager 1991). In its first three years, capital appeals accounted for 
39 percent of the published output of the Lucas court (Uelmen 1989) while 
other matters were neglected (Hager 1990b). This endless and depressing 
preoccupation with capital cases is widely believed to be the main reason for 
the rapid turnover that has plagued the California Supreme Court recently, 
4 resignations in 3 years, including all three justices appointed by Deukmejian 
after the 1986 election (Hager 1990a; Hager and Gillam 1991). 
Whatever the view from the California Supreme Court, the death penalty 
remains very popular among Californians at large. Since the mid-1980s the 
polls have shown 80 percent or more in favor (Field and DiCamillo 1992). 
In the political arena, active support for capital punishment is now a practical 
requirement for any serious candidate for state-wide office in California. For 
example, one of the two candidates in the 1990 Democratic gubernatorial 
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primary was the Attorney General, John Van De Kamp, who was personally 
opposed to the death penalty. Nonetheless, Van De Kamp made a point of 
his willingness to enforce California's death penalty law-"1 respect the fact 
the people have spoken" (Mathews, Broder and Taylor 1990)-and 
campaigned as "the only candidate for governor, Democrat or Republican, 
who has put people on death row in California" (Love 1990). He lost. The 
winner was Dianne Feinstein, the former Mayor of San Francisco, who made 
the death penalty a focus of her campaign, and who claimed that she was the 
candidate with the truest and most personal commitment to conducting 
executions (Love 1990; Mathews, Broder, and Taylor 1990). 
For all this commotion, there has been only one execution in California since 
1967-that for Robert Alton Harris, whose sentence had been affirmed by the 
Bird Court in 1981. As of this writing, no others seem near (Bishop 1992). 
MORE OF THE SAME 
At a glance, the death rows of America seem headed for a massacre. Public 
support for the death penalty is intense, politicians fan the heat, and condemned 
prisoners pile up like dry brush. When Robert Alton Harris was put to death 
in April, 1992, some observers speculated that the first execution in California 
in a quarter of a century would be the spark. This was hardly the first time 
that waves of executions have been predicted. The same was said (among other 
occasions) in 1976, after Gregg; in 1977, when the first post-Gregg execution 
occurred; in 1983, when the Supreme Court drastically revised the restrictions 
on capital punishment that it had imposed; and in 1987, when the Court rejected 
Warren McCleskey's challenge to racial discrimination in capital sentencing. 
It hasn't happened. 
These projections were not all completely wrong-executions did begin after 
Gregg, and the pace did increase in 1983-but the anticipated flood has never 
occurred. I do not think it will happen now either, although the rate of 
executions is likely to move up a notch from 15 or 20 a year to 30, 40, or 
conceivably 50. That would be a change, but only in degree not in kind. Even 
at fifty a year, executions would still be infrequent-the exception rather than 
the rule after a death sentence-and they would still be slow, costly and 
unpredictable. 
My basic argument why little is likely to change is simply this: Appearances 
to the contrary notwithstanding, the death penalty we have is pretty much the 
death penalty we want. The costs of the process are mostly hidden from view. 
Politicians and judges grumble about delays, but the system does produce what 
the public demands: a widely available death penalty that is rarely carried out. 
There are two parts to this argument. 
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First, support "for the death penalty" does not necessarily mean support 
for executions. Public attitudes on criminal sentencing are notoriously 
inconsistent. Several researchers have asked samples of the population to state 
their opinions on the sentences courts generally pronounce, and large majorities 
said that they were too lenient. However, when asked to evaluate actual court 
sentences, or to choose the terms themselves, most of the same people found 
the judicial sentences to be about right or too harsh (Doob and Roberts 1983, 
1988; Stalans and Diamond 1990). In the context of the death penalty, many 
people say they are for "mandatory" death sentences for certain crimes-killing 
a police officer, for example, or homicide in the course of a rape-but then 
choose life imprisonment as the correct penalty in just such a case.45 Bedau 
has argued that many of those who say they favor capital punishment may 
want "only the legal threat of the death penalty, coupled with the judicial ritual 
of trying, convicting, and occasionally sentencing a murderer to death, rather 
than actual executions" (Bedau 1982, p. 68). Some people, I expect, support 
capital punishment in order to keep every possible weapon in the public arsenal; 
others favor the death penalty (with or without executions) simply because 
they do not believe that life imprisonment lasts for life.46 
Second, and more important, even those who do want executions do not 
want many. The retributive argument for executing killers is usually stated in 
terms of equivalence and consistency-"a life for a life." The actual impulse, 
however, seems to focus on symbolism and ceremony. Many Americans, 
probably a majority, want some executions to take place as public statements 
about crime and murder. But that desire can be satisfied by a small number 
of well publicized electrocutions and poisonings. Few advocates of capital 
punishment-probably none-would seriously argue that we should strive to 
take a life for each of 20,000 homicide victims who are killed each year, or 
even for each of 2,000. "Twenty-thousand homicides" is not an event-like 
a TV news story-it's a statistic (and an obscure statistic at that). 
Bedau suggests that "the average person seems convinced the death penalty 
is an important legal threat, abstractly desirable as part of society's permanent 
bulwark against crime, but that he or she is relatively indifferent to whether 
a given convict ... is ever executed" (Bed au 1982, p. 68). Bed au is probably right, 
although that does not mean that the average death penalty supporter is 
indifferent to whether anybody is ever executed. If we conduct no executions 
capital punishment will cease to be a threat, even abstractly-indeed, we will 
not have a death penalty. The anger that built up in California through the 
1980s was expressed in just those terms: We voted for the death penalty 
repeatedly and by overwhelming margins, and yet years have gone by and 
nobody has been put to death; the will of the people has been thwarted. That 
sort offrustration, however powerful, is easily alleviated. The public may insist 
on occasional executions, but it does not demand many. 
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But lack of demand will not stop executions in itself. If the machinery were 
in place, it could crank out 100 or 200 a year whether or not anybody wants 
them unless there is some positive force to limit the output. In fact, the 
conditions for that scenario are not met, in two respects. First, the metaphor 
is wrong. Our capital punishment system is not an assembly line that has been 
constructed at great cost, but once in place chugs along predictably grinding 
out executions. To conduct executions a state must overcome two types of 
resistance: internally, the inertia, the doubts, the unease and the ambivalence 
of some or all of the officials who handle the cases; and externally, the legal 
moves of the defense attorneys. A few condemned prisoners slip cheaply 
through the cracks, but they are the exceptions. Typically each execution 
requires a fresh commitment of significant state resources. 
Second, there is widespread aversion to the prospect of numerous executions. 
It shows up repeatedly, and in different contexts; it is a startling illustration 
of the abstract nature of most people's attitudes toward capital punishment. 
A single execution is not truly an act of revenge but it looks like revenge, it 
symbolizes our desire and our willingness to seek vengeance. When we single 
out one murderer we can focus on what he did to deserve death. But if we 
were to conduct a hundred executions in close order we would lose any illusion 
of individual vengeance; all we would see is mass killing by the state, slaughter. 
The symbolism would change; the issue would now be the nature of our society, 
our culture. At a minimum, it would be a humiliating comment on our failure 
to control violence by less bloody means; at worst it would provoke repulsive 
comparisons with Hitler and Stalin. 
This aversion to mass executions was a central aspect of the legal strategy 
of theN AACP Legal Defense Fund in late 1960s. During the moratorium years 
from 1967 through 1972 approximately 700 inmates accumulated on death row, 
an unprecedented number, all of whom were subject to execution if the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment. The 
prospect of a bloodbath may have given the Court pause. Justice Hugo Black-
who resigned and then died the year before Furman, and who personally 
believed in the constitutionality of capital punishment-is said to have 
predicted privately that the Court would strike down the death penalty because 
the Court "would not want that much blood on its hands" (Woodward and 
Armstrong 1979, p. 207). 
Since Gregg it has become clear that no Supreme Court decision will produce 
a bloodbath. Nowadays, in the wake of a conspicuous execution or a legal 
defeat for death penalty opponents, the press frequently publishes stories that 
say the opposite: No, there will not be hundreds of executions in quick 
succession, there are still many procedural obstacles that will slow the process 
down (e.g., Shapiro 1986; Taylor 1987; Bishop 1992). The message to the public 
is unmistakable: Don't worry, we won't start having lots more executions than 
you want. Even at current levels the number of executions we conduct can 
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produce criticism. In 1987, Louisiana executed 8 prisoners in the space of a 
few months; as a result the state was targeted by Amnesty International for 
human rights violations, and state officials began to receive critical mail from 
Amnesty members and government leaders from around the world (Prejean 
1988). More recently Death Watch, a British human rights group, has started 
urging British tourists to boycott one of their more popular vacation sites-
Florida, "the Sunshine State that kills. ,,o~? In 1992 there was a spate of negative 
reports in the European Press on Robert Alton Harris's execution, including 
the comment that the United States "executes its criminals in greater numbers 
than any country except Iraq and Iran-sad comparisons" (Associated Press 
1992c). 
So far, my argument is abstract. I have identified pressures and 
counterpressures, and made the claim that the number of executions will not 
increase dramatically. But how do these forces play out? Certainly there are 
no coordinating bodies that set the rates, nationally or state by state. By what 
mechanisms, then, do these pressures limit the number of prisoners who are 
put to death? 
The major force that limits the rate of executions is simply the structure 
of the system-the number and the complexity of the procedural hurdles that 
must be cleared, and the inevitable setbacks along the way. For more than 
a decade critics of the process have focused their attention on the last stage, 
federal habeas corpus.48 For example, in 1989 retired Supreme Court Justice 
Lewis Powell wrote an article complaining about the delays in executing death 
sentences, delays which he attributed to abuse of federal habeas corpus: "If 
capital punishment is to serve its intended purposes, perhaps the time has come 
for some reexamination of our system of dual collateral review" (Powell1989, 
p. 1035). It is true that federal habeas corpus used to be a narrow valve that 
severely restricted the flow of death cases. Before 1983, federal-court hearings 
were comparatively easy to obtain in death cases, and an extraordinary 
proportion of such cases were reversed (see note 32). Since 1983,49 and 
especially since 1989,50 the Supreme Court has been busily limiting the scope 
of habeas corpus and restricting access to the federal courts. These revisions 
have made a difference. The Barefoot decision in 1983 was probably the most 
important single reason for the increase in executions from 1 or 2 a year to 
10 or 20; the recent spate of cutbacks is likely to push the number up over 
30. Nonetheless, the changes in federal habeas corpus that have occurred-
which are at least as radical as any Justice Powell mentioned-will do no more 
than put a dent in the delay and infrequency he criticized. 
Part of the reason is that federal habeas corpus survives, albeit in reduced 
form. Some issues still must be heard; on others, federal trial court judges now 
have essentially unreviewable discretion to conduct review or to refuse to do 
so (Liebman 1991). The upshot is that many state death sentences are being 
held up or reversed by the federal courts, but the process has become even 
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less predictable than in the past. At one extreme there is David Michael Clark, 
who was executed in Texas on February 28, 1992. His attorney filed an initial 
habeas petition in federal district court on January 16, 1992; it was denied in 
about half an hour, the denial was affirmed on appeal about one hour later, 
and the Supreme Court denied a stay of execution the next day.51 At the other 
end of the spectrum, there are death cases in which the prisoners file federal 
habeas petitions, the district courts grant stays, and then for several years 
nothing happens whatever. 
The Supreme Court, or Congress, may limit federal habeas still further. 
Whatever they do, however, will probably have only a marginal effect on the 
rate of executions. Most death cases have never reached federal habeas corpus; 
most of the delay and most of the reversals have always occurred in the state 
courts. The drastic changes in habeas corpus have increased the pace of 
executions among the comparatively small number of cases that do reach that 
stage but they have not encouraged state courts to affirm more death sentences. 
If anything, the trend seems to be the opposite: as federal oversight has 
decreased some state supreme courts have become more prone to reverse. The 
diminution of federal habeas has certainly done nothing to speed the progress 
of capital appeals through the state courts. Once again, California provides 
the starkest example. The California Supreme Court is now into the sixth year 
of a concerted campaign to keep current on its capital docket. Nonetheless, 
as of April, 1992, about 200 death 'cases were pending on direct appeal-76 
without defense lawyers-and the time between sentence and decision had risen 
to nearly 6 years (Bishop 1992). Apparently, the court has reached the limit 
of its capacity to process capital appeals, to no avail. 
Direct review is not, of course, the only stage at which the actions of state 
officials influence the rate of executions. There is state collateral review, there 
is executive clemency (a rarely exercised power in this era [Bedau 1991]), and 
there are various procedural interstices in which death cases are sometimes 
allowed to sit and wait for months or years: between verdict and judgment, 
between judgment and the filing of an appeal, between direct review and state 
habeas corpus, between state review and federal habeas corpus, between federal 
habeas corpus and the setting of an execution date. 
No doubt some of the judges, governors and attorneys general who are 
responsible for overseeing this process have their own misgivings about the 
death penalty. Others may prefer to keep down the number of executions even 
if they do not oppose capital punishment in principle. They might not want 
their state to be labelled "the Iran of America," or they might be anxious to 
limit the number of times they make a public decision that could turn out to 
have been a terrible and embarrassing mistake. But for the most part, I suspect, 
state officials are not so much wary about moving ahead with too many 
executions as unmotivated. Almost every execution produces a flurry of 
activity, antagonizes some constituency, and poses some political risk. These 
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are not prohibitive costs-far from it-but they mount. When there are no 
executions or very few the pressure to kill may get high, and the possible 
political gain from each execution is real. But when executions take place at 
a regular pace, however slow, there is no public pressure to speed things up. 
Once that point is reached, state officials have little incentive (and significant 
disincentives) to set aside other cases in order to affirm yet another death 
sentence, to assign another assistant attorney general to briefing capital appeals, 
or to devote scarce resources to pushing recalcitrant judges into action and 
chasing death row inmates through the courts. So death cases-many of 
them-are allowed to linger, and linger (see Zimring 1991). 
By now prosecutors and judges must realize that most death sentences are 
not carried out even if they are affirmed, even in states that do conduct some 
executions. So why bother? Ultimately, this feedback from the end of the line 
is likely to discourage prosecutors from filing capital charges in homicide cases 
that are not politically sensitive. This may already have started in some 
jurisdictions. In New Jersey, for example, prosecutors sought death sentences 
in 57 percent of potentially capital homicide trials from 1983 through 1987, 
but in only 35 percent of such cases since the beginning of 1988.52 This same 
knowledge may also discourage state appellate courts from affirming death 
sentences, or at least from doing so expeditiously. On the other hand, there 
are constant incentives to reverse death cases, and, if possible, to do so quickly. 
A reversal on one issue may obviate the need to decide ten others. A case that 
is dumped on direct review will not be back and occupy the court's time on 
state habeas corpus. And finally, there is bed pressure. Death rows are filling 
up and overflowing. State supreme courts and attorneys general can alleviate 
this problem by reversing or dropping close cases, by accelerating consideration 
of those cases that are likely to be reversed, and by choosing to forego new 
capital proceedings after reversal. Knowing that most death row inmates never 
get executed anyway makes these options easier.lt would be cynical to conclude 
that docket pressure and similar considerations are the main determinants of 
the outcomes and timing of decisions on capital appeals and collateral review, 
but it would be naive to suppose that they do not make a great deal of difference 
in the large range of marginal cases. 
If the forces I have described do in fact determine the rate of executions, 
we should expect them, eventually, to reach some sort of equilibrium. For the 
United States as a whole that certainly has not happened. The population on 
death row continues to increase by about 140 a year, and the pace of executions 
may also be increasing. 53 However, in several states that have been conducting 
executions since the early 1980s equilibria may already have been established. 
The clearest example is Georgia. Five prisoners were put to death in Georgia 
in 1987, the highest annual total in the post-Gregg period; only 3 have been 
executed in the five-and-a-half years since. The number of death row inmates, 
however, has remained almost constant for nearly twelve years: it was 106 in 
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June 1981, 106 in May 1987, and 107 in April 1993. In that entire period 15 
executions were conducted in Georgia (an average of less than 1.3 a year), 139 
new death sentences were pronounced, and 123 prisoners were removed from 
death row because of reversals on direct or collateral review, or death from 
suicide, homicide or natural causes. 
Florida may have achieved a similar equilibrium more recently. There were 
8 executions in Florida in 1984, but only four or fewer each year since. In 
Florida, however, unlike Georgia, the number of prisoners on death row 
continued to increase for several years after the high point in executions, from 
223 in December 1984, to 313 in September 1990. At that point, it hit a plateau. 
From September 1990 through April 1993, 6 prisoners were executed in 
Florida, while approximately 100 new defendants were sentenced to death. 
Reversals and deaths from other causes, however, kept pace, and the death 
row population hardly changed, from 313 to 317. Louisiana seems to be 
following a similar path, although the number of death row inmates is 
considerably smaller. There were 8 executions in Louisiana in 1987, but only 
6 in the 5 1 I 2 years since. In the meantime, the size of Louisiana's death row 
dropped from 52 in May 1987 to 34 in April 1991; in April 1993 it was 410. 
Georgia, Florida and Louisiana are among the four leading states in number 
of post-Gregg executions. In each of these states a big year for executions was 
followed by a sharp and apparently lasting slowdown. In each the size of the 
death row population seems to have stabilized at some point after post-Gregg 
executions started up again. Alabama (which ranks sixth in the number of 
recent executions), and Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina (with four 
post-Furman executions each) may be following the same pattern, but it's too 
early to say. 
Other death penalty states are definitely not falling into line, so far. 
Conspicuously, in Texas-which has executed 56 prisoners since Gregg, more 
by far than any other state-the death row population and the execution rate 
are both on the increase. In addition, death rows have been growing steadily 
in several states that have held no post-Gregg executions, or have just recently 
begun-California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Ohio, Arizona, and 
Tennessee. Still, the experience of Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana may 
foreshadow the general look of the death penalty in America at the turn of 
the century, when executions have once again become an established fact in 
most or all death penalty states. If the rest of the country does follow suit we 
could reach a national equilibrium in 10 or 15 years. Projecting from recent 
experience, it might be something like this: A death row population of about 
4000, to which roughly 200 new death sentenced inmates are added each year, 
and from which roughly 200 are removed: 35 by execution, 100 by reversal 
on direct appeal, 40 by reversal in collateral proceedings, 10 by commutation, 
and 15 by death from other causes. 
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These numbers, of course, are guesswork. Any actual equilibrium may be 
quite different, and-if it is established-will shift and change in response to 
changes in society. In addition, under my plausible scenario, the population 
on death row will age and its health will decline. Unless governors begin a 
regular practice of commuting the sentences of aged and infirm prisoners, the 
number of deaths on death row from natural causes may someday exceed the 
number of executions. 
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I. People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935,968-971, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679,697-698 (1981)), Bird, C.J., 
dissenting. 
2. See Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
3. Tennessee v. Payne, Ill S.Ct. 2597 (1991). 
4. See id. n.2; State v. Huetas, 51 Ohio St. 3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (1990). 
5. The exception is automatic review by the state supreme court, which is not generally 
available in non-capital cases. For example, compare Florida Constitution, Art. V § 3 (death 
penalty appeals are within the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court) with Florida Constitution 
Art. V § 4 (other criminal appeals within the jurisdiction of the Florida District Courts of Appeal). 
6. One of the classic statements of this position is by Justice Harlan, concurring in the 
judgment in Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. I, 77 (1956): "I do not concede that whatever process is 
'due' and offender faced with a fine or prison sentence necessarily satifies the requirements of the 
constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no means novel... nor is it negligible, being, 
literally that between life and death." See also, for example, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion) (1976). 
7. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
8. Murray v. Giarrtano, 492 U.S. I (1989). 
9. This estimate is based on conversations with Ms. Karima Wicks, former Research Director 
of the Death Penalty Project of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. In 1988, her 
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predecessor-Ms. Tanya Coke-informed me that as of that time, the reversal rate on initial review 
was 41 percent (Gross and Mauro 1989, pp. 220, 226-27). Although I do not have comparably 
precise information for the last few years, I understand that close observers believe that for the 
country as a whole the reversal rate has increased. 
10. CNN News, April20, 1991, Transcript #12-1. 
II. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Death Row U.S.A., Spring 1993 ("Death 
Row U.S.A.''). 
12. /d. 
13. These calculations are based on Death Row U.S.A. (note II) and additional data provided 
by courtesy of Ms. Karima Wicks, former Research Director, Capital Punishment Project of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. The averages given exclude "voluntary executions"-cases in which 
a prisoner was executed after waiving an available avenue of review. 
14. For example, in 1975 Ellsworth and Ross (1983, pp. 145-46) found that 62 percent of a 
sample of Californians, and 93 percent of those who favor capital punishment, believed the death 
penalty deters homicide more than life imprisonment. Similarly, in 1985 the Gallup Poll 
organization found that 62 percent of a national sample thought the death penalty deterred murder; 
in 1986, 61 percent; and in 1991, 51 percent. Alec Gallup & Frank Newport, "Death Penalty 
Support Remains Stron, But Most Fell Unfairly Applied," The Gallup Poll News Service, Vol. 
56 No. Sa, 6/26/91 p. 3. 
15. The other two commonly cited justifications for criminal sanctions are not relevant here. 
The death penalty, obviously, is incompatible with rehabilitation, and, while it is a permanent 
incapacitator, so (in theory at least) is the usual alternative-life imprisonment. Some people do 
support the death penalty because they fear that life imprisonment will not be what it is supposed 
to be (Ellsworth and Ross 1983, pp. 151-52) but that is a weak sort of support for capital 
punishment, if it is support for capital punishment at all. 
16. On occasion throughout this paper I refer to death penalty defendants using male 
pronouns. This is an empirical generalization-a strong one-rather than a linguistic convention. 
For example, as of April 1993, over 98 percent of death row inmates in the United States were 
men, as were all but one of the first 199 prisoners executed after 1976. (See Death Row U.S.A., 
note II.) 
17. Death Row U.S.A. (note ll). 
18. For example, Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski (1990, pp. 88-89) found that 80 percent 
of a post-Furman sample of Georgia murder convictions, 483 out of 606, were death eligible. 
19. For example, Gallup and Newport (note 14) found that 18 percent opposed the death 
penalty in 1991. 
20. For example, "Harris, who became notorious for snacking smugly on a bag of hamburgers 
taken from his victims .... " (Anderson 1991; see also Time 1992). 
21. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Bullington 
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). 
23. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
24. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
25. 408 u.s. 238. 
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens). 
27. Gallup and Newport (note 14). 
28. 428 u.s. 153. 
29. Death Row U.S.A. (note I 1). 
30. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
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31. See, for example, Lockett v. Ohio, 486 U.S. 586 (1978); Godrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 
(1980); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). 
32. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall) 
(capital defendants won 23 of 34 fenderal habeas corpus cases decided by circuit courts of appeals 
between 1976 and 1983). 
33. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 880, 915 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Pulley 
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
34. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
35. McCleskey v. Kemp, 408 S. Ct. 279 (1987). 
36. Teaguev. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); McCleskeyv. Zant, Ill S.Ct. l454(199l)(McCleskey 
II). 
37. Death Row U.S.A. (note II). 
38. South Africa may no longer belong on this list since a moratorium on executions went 
into effect in November, 1989 (Reuters 1992). 
39. Gallup and Newport (note 14). 
40. Death Row U.S.A. (note II). 
41. Data obtained from Mr. Peter Duffin, Gallup Poll, Gallup House, 307 Finchley Rd., 
London NE3 6EH ("British Gallup Data"). 
42. British Gallup Data (note 41). 
43. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152. 
44. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976). 
45. Phoebe Ellsworth, "Attitudes towards Capital Punishment: From Application to Theory" 
(Paper presented at the SESP Symposium on Psychology and Law, Stanford University, October 
1978). 
46. For example, Ellsworth and Ross, (1983, pp. 151-52) found that 50 percent of their 
respondents agreed that "Even when a murderer gets a life sentence, he usually gets out on parole, 
so it is better to execute him," and 65 percent agreed that "One advantage of the death penalty 
is that it makes it impossible for convicted murderers to later go free on account of some legal 
technicality." 
47. National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Lifelines, no. 56, April/ May I June 1992, 
p. 8. 
48. A conspicuous early example is then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's opinion dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari in Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-7 (1980). 
49. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
50. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
51. Clark v. Collins 112 S.Ct. 924 (1992) (opinion of Justice Stevens dissenting from the denial 
of a stay) (see Coyle 1992). 
52. David C. Baldus, "Proportionality Review of Death Sentences: New Jersey's Options," 
working draft, University of Iowa, May II, 1992 (cited with the author's permission). 
53. The data in this paragraph, and the several paragraphs following it, are derived from Death 
Row U.S.A. (note II) together with additional data generously provided by Ms. Karima Wicks, 
former Research Director, Capital Punishment Project of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund. 
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